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Defying a 2003 agreement to halt its nuclear program, Iran resumed its nuclear
activities in 2005 despite the objections and sanctions of a concerned international
community. Theoretical frameworks in international relations may suggest the
strategic environment, regime type, and international institutions as key variables
to explain foreign policy-making. In this article, it is argued that nuclear decision-
making in Tehran cannot be understood through a “black-box” model that would
assume Iran to be a unitary rational actor that knows its capabilities, interests, and
wants. Instead, one must investigate the changes in the domestic decision-making
and bargaining process through a bureaucratic politics model. Although some
point out hardliner President Ahmadinejad as the sole decision-maker, we argue
that a single individual could not have changed the course of the entire country;
there were coalitions and struggles among multiple actors within the regime.
Analyzing two different eras within the case of Iran, we argue that the shift in
bureaucratic coalitions among the Supreme Leader, the President, the Revolutionary
Guards, the Atomic Energy Agency of Iran, and the Supreme National Security
Council explains the shift in Iranian foreign policy. In our conclusion, we draw
several implications of this argument for the scholarly literature and offer policy-
prescriptive advice.
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Despite numerous declarations, promises, and agreements with the EU-3, Iran’s
position on its nuclear program continues to raise concerns for policymakers and
scholars alike. Iran’s relationship with the international community on its nuclear
program was not as defiant as it seems today; Iran engaged in multilateral negotiations
and committed to various international agreements between 2002 and 2005. Since late
2005, however, Iran has moved away and has continued a defiant and non-cooperative
stance against the international community, despite numerous international incentives
and sanctions. What explains the difference in Iran’s foreign policy orientation on its
nuclear program? To what extent do international institutions sanctions and incentives
solicit cooperation? What is the role of domestic variables in Iranian nuclear decision
making? These questions have a venerable lineage in the fields of international relations
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theory, international security, and in policy-making circles in Washington and European
capitals. The core argument in this paper is that an analysis of domestic actors, alliances,
bargaining, and changes in relative power positions can wield important insights to
understand the sources of Iranian foreign policy.
In 2002, a group of Iranian exiles and dissidents drew attention to Iran’s secret
facilities in Natanz and Arak; which was immediately followed by France, Germany,
the UK (EU-3), and the United States referring the issue to the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA).1 Bilateral negotiations with the EU-3 resulted in confidence-
building measures including Iran’s commitment to temporarily suspend its uranium-
enrichment activities and to voluntarily comply with the Additional Protocol.2 Following
ups and downs with the IAEA, Iran signed the Paris Agreement with the EU-3 in
November 2004, where Iran reiterated its commitment to the Additional Protocol,
suspended all enrichment and processing related activities, welcomed economic
incentives and peaceful nuclear energy transfer from the EU, and hailed the success
of multilateralism. Iran seemed to be cooperative with the IAEA, major international
powers, and international agreements.
The rapprochement between Iran and the EU-3 was short-lived, however. Despite
a subsequent EU-3 proposal including economic incentives and security guarantees
on August 6, 2005, Iran rejected the package as “ridiculous and disparaging” and
“irrevocably” resumed uranium processing activities on August 8, 2005.3 In response,
the EU-3 offered another package in June 2006, including “the construction of light
water nuclear reactors, sale of commercial aircraft, a long-term energy partnership,”
and the UN Security Council passed four rounds of targeted sanctions starting from
2006.4 Still, Iran continued its nuclear activities and Iranian foreign policy remained
defiant toward the international community.
The change and continuity of a state’s foreign policy have been a major area of
research in international relations theory. Whereas some theories focus on international
institutions and sanctions (neoliberal institutionalism), others single out security factors
and threat environments (realism), and still others point out culture and norms that
shape foreign policy (constructivism). The existing scholarly literature on Iranian nuclear
policy can accordingly be divided as follows: One argument is that Iran’s decision to
continue its nuclear program can be related to the external strategic environment.5 A
second group of arguments emphasizes the impact of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT), sanctions, and multilateral negotiations on Iran’s nuclear policy.6 A third
group of arguments centers on historical legacies, norms, and the cultural significance
of acquiring nuclear capabilities.7
Although the aforementioned literature gives rich details from particular perspec-
tives, little attention has been paid to the dynamics of Iranian domestic decision-making.
Decision-making does not occur in a vacuum; policy outcomes are the result of the
interaction of competing preferences among various actors within the regime. Our
argument is that external variables have different meanings and are interpreted dif-
ferently among domestic actors, which is why a bureaucratic politics model seems
most relevant to an understanding of foreign policy-making. In this article we use
Graham Allison’s seminal bureaucratic politics model and test its applicability in a
non-democratic regime.8 Our findings suggest that while Allison’s model is applicable
to the Iranian case, critical supplements must be taken into consideration such as that of
Rosati, who stresses the role and relative power of the top decision-maker.9 Iran’s breach
of the 2003 deal with the EU can be explained as a result of a domestic bargaining
process among central decision-makers. According to Allison’s bureaucratic politics
model, the preferences, interests and relative power positions among nuclear decision-
makers would be crucial to understand the shift in Iranian nuclear policy. Whereas
the coalition between the Supreme Leader and reformist factions headed by President
Khatami had a major influence in the previous cooperative era, the realignment of
the Supreme Leader with the newly elected hardliner President and his associates in the
Revolutionary Guards was the reason behind a defiant nuclear policy in the latter era.
The destructive power of nuclear weapons continues to disturb security scholars
and concerned citizens of the world. Amidst the danger of nuclear proliferation in
the Middle East, growing issues on the international political agenda are nuclear
North Korea’s recent provocative moves on the Korean peninsula, the security of the
Russian nuclear stockpile, and the possibility of a terrorist network’s acquiring a
nuclear device, nuclear proliferation, and disarmament.10 The raw material for
nuclear weapons comes from the reprocessing of plutonium or the enrichment of
uranium, which is why major actors such as the United States and the European
Union closely follow several nuclear programs’ compliance with the Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT).11 There remains, however, a difference in method within the trans-
Atlantic alliance. Where the European Union puts emphasis on multilateral negotia-
tions, the United States, under the previous administration, considered unilateral 
pre-emptive strikes as an option. With the Obama administration, diplomacy and
sanctions seems to have replaced the option of strikes. However, it is not inconceivable
that the United States, or Israel, may resort to unilateral air-strikes on Iranian nuclear
facilities. The Iranians have repeatedly mentioned that any such action will be met
with catastrophic retaliation on Western bases and interests in the region. For example,
Iran’s capability to disrupt oil transportation in the Strait of Hormuz would send shock-
waves in global petroleum markets comparable in consequences to the effects of the
oil crisis of the 1970s.12 Avoiding such possibilities is imperative for the international
community, which is still suffering from the effects of a major global recession.
A bureaucratic politics perspective on the Iranian nuclear issue can explain the
shift in Iranian decision-making and provide a better understanding of possible reso-
lutions of this conflict for scholars, policymakers, and non-proliferation activists.
The bureaucratic politics model also serves as a test of the extent to which external
variables (sanctions, incentives, security environment) matter in decision-making.13
The structure of this essay is as follows: First, we review existing theoretical
explanations on Iran’s nuclear policy. Second, we go over the bureaucratic politics
model, as originally developed by Allison. In this section we examine some of the
recent developments in this literature, review criticisms and present the model’s
applicability to the Iranian case. Third, the key decision-makers in Iran are identified—
namely, the Supreme Leader, the President, the Supreme National Security Council
(SNSC), the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and the Islamic Revolu-
tionary Guard Corps (IRGC). This paper analyzes these key actors’ relative positions,
interests and preferences in the decision-making process, and then applies the
bureaucratic politics model to two different eras in Iran (pre-2005 and post-2005).
Finally, we analyze some of the promises and shortcomings of the bureaucratic politics
model and offer policy-prescriptive advice.
Theories of Foreign Policy and Nuclear Programs
Realist theories, focusing on the strategic environment, argue that states pursue survival
strategies to maintain their position in the international system.14 A realist theory of
nuclear policy would argue that the external security environment of a state may
provide powerful incentives for acquiring a nuclear capability.15 For example, Waltz
argues that “nuclear weapons dissuade states more surely than conventional
weapons do” due to their mutual destruction capability and their domination of war
strategies. Nuclear programs are steps toward acquiring nuclear weapons capability.
Accordingly, Iran would want to continue its nuclear program to acquire the capability
to build nuclear weapons in order to secure itself.16
From a realist perspective, Iran’s nuclear ambitions could be explained with 
reference to three security related issues. First, the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan
and Iraq, Iran’s immediate neighbors, contributes to Iran’s fear of its immediate
security and Iranian threat perception has further exacerbated with U.S. developed
notions such as “axis of evil” and “pre-emptive war.”17 Accordingly Iran may wish a
nuclear weapon to deter the United States from a possible invasion.18 The fact that
the United States has not taken action against states with nuclear weapons such as
Pakistan and North Korea may increase this desire. Second, Iran has several nuclear
states in the region such as Pakistan, Israel and India.19 The developments in the
external environment further undermines Iran’s weakness and its outdated equipment
and weak conventional forces. It is therefore reasonable to say, through realism, that
Iran may push for a nuclear program to acquire nuclear weapons in order to substitute
for its weak conventional forces and strengthen its security in the region.20 Third,
one may also argue that Iran was always committed to acquiring a nuclear capability;
after the discovery of its program it only engaged in cooperative behavior to buy time.
Although realism provides useful insights as to why Iran may want to acquire
nuclear capability, it fails to account for many dilemmas. First, the presence of the
United States in the neighborhood and Pakistani and Israeli nuclear weapons pose a
vague threat to Iran.21 It could be argued that Iran has “no urgent strategic rationale,
due to the lack of any existential threats or imminent enemies.”22 Furthermore,
Iran’s major regional challenger, Iraq, had already been neutralized in 2003. Second,
even though realism may give us a sense as to why Iran may pursue a nuclear program,
it does not explain the change in Iran’s stance toward the international community.
There is no change in the threats discussed above between pre-2005 and post-2005
periods; therefore, realism falls short of explaining the change in Iranian foreign policy.
Third, not all states are hard-wired to maximize their material capabilities and it
does not automatically follow from realist logic that states are hard-wired to build a
bomb for deterrence. In line with the previous points, the strategic environment of a
state does not automatically necessitate it to build nuclear weapons.
Another school of thought that may explain Iran’s nuclear program would
emphasize the role and function of the NPT regime. Neoliberal institutionalism
focuses on international institutions as possible tools for international cooperation.23
The point of departure is that “conflict in world politics is unnecessary or avoidable
when the actors fail to agree even though their preferences overlap.”24 It follows that
if there are international institutions mitigating uncertainty in anarchy, states may
engage in cooperative behavior. Designing international institutions that reward
cooperation and discourage defections and cheating would, ideally, mitigate the 
negative aspects of anarchy.25 In this sense, the NPT is an international regime
designed to curb the spread of nuclear weapons by having states commit to certain
rules and regulations regarding nuclear research and energy.
Iran has been a party to the NPT and has signed the comprehensive safeguards
agreement with the IAEA. One may suggest that this international regime has had
some effect on Iranian foreign policy. A neoliberal institutionalist would expect Iran
to continue to comply with the NPT so long as there are benefits from holding onto
the treaty’s commitments. Nevertheless, Iran does challenge the “rules of the game” by
declaring that allowing five permanent members of the UN Security Council to retain
nuclear weapons is hypocrisy.26 Accordingly, Iran’s breach of IAEA safeguards can
be explained with the Iranian perception of Israel’s non-membership of the NPT as the
relative cost of compliance with the regime. One may further argue that Iran’s decision
to breach the former agreements with the EU-3 in 2005, including the Additional
Protocol, is because it does not see the NPT as serving its interests. However, the
relevant international institutions and the NPT did not change during the period
between 2003 and 2005, which raises the question why Iran appeared committed to
cooperating with the EU-3 and the IAEA in 2003 and not from 2005 onwards.
Another major IR theory is constructivism, which puts emphasis on the role of
norms and symbols in a state’s foreign policy-making. Accordingly, a state’s decision-
making is shaped by discourse and shared beliefs about what actions are legitimate
and appropriate in a given international relations context.27 Constructivist scholarship
on nuclear weapons has produced rich accounts of the ‘nuclear taboo’ or how nuclear
weapons have come to be viewed as symbols of technical prowess, modernity, and
prestige.28 Individual case studies on several states such as France, China and 
Australia indicate that these countries sought prestige through nuclear weapons.29
Such a constructivist argument may appear to be applicable to the Iranian case as
well. A discourse analysis may reveal how Iranian leaders have in fact continuously
emphasized the nuclear program as a symbol of self-reliance, independence, techno-
logical development and modernity.30
Although constructivist variables as symbols and norms have explanatory power
in identifying possible motives for Iran’s nuclear program, these norms and symbols
were already in effect during 2003 and 2005. Since the resumption of nuclear activities
during the Khamenei era, nuclear weapons have always been regarded as symbols of
prestige for Iranian leaders. Therefore, it is difficult to explain the shift in Iranian
nuclear policy with reference to norms.31 Furthermore, as Sagan argues, symbols
and ideas do not have power on their own but are reshaped and manipulated in the
hands of certain groups who would have a stake in them.32 The analysis of domestic
actors in the pre-2005 and the post-2005 periods in the following sections show how
Iran’s nuclear program has become further politicized in domestic politics in the
post-2005 period. Following Sagan’s point, this paper argues that the role of nuclear
symbolism could be better understood through a bureaucratic politics perspective.
Another theory of foreign policy with specific emphasis on nuclear programs is
advanced by Etel Solingen, who discusses the implication of domestic coalitions on 
Iranian nuclear decision-making. Her main argument is that leaders and ruling coalitions’
responses to “internationalization” are the main reason for the differing nuclear
behavior.33 Leaders and ruling coalitions favoring internationalization have greater
incentives to “avoid the political, economic, reputational and opportunity costs of acquir-
ing nuclear weapons, because costs impair their domestic agenda.”34 Furthermore,
“Internationalizing models are not necessary but likely to be sufficient for denucleariza-
tion except under two circumstances: (a) when neighboring inward-looking regimes
seek nuclear weapons (or other WMD); and (b) when nuclear weapons were acquired
prior to the inception of internationalizing models.”35 Solingen points out inward-oriented
Middle Eastern countries that rely on economic self-sufficiency, nationalist values, and
regime survival. As in the Iranian case, a shift of presidency among domestic factions
has direct implications for the change in the executive’s course of handling the issue with
other international actors. While Solingen’s emphasis on domestic actors’ response to
“internationalization” broadens our understanding of how domestic factions’ economic
interests steer the course of nuclearization in Iran, we suggest that an economic rationale
is only one factor among others. Our study contributes to Solingen’s argument on 
the relationship between domestic politics and nuclearization by highlighting how the
shift in the bureaucratic organization of nuclear decision-making and in their personnel
composition affects Iranian nuclear negotiations with third parties. In this respect, personal
and parochial interests of various bureaucratic institutions and their personnel deserve
more attention in our study.36
Although realism, neoliberal institutionalism and constructivism have explanatory
power in understanding Iran’s motives for its nuclear program, these theories overlook
important dynamics in the shift in Iranian nuclear policy in 2005. There are no major
differences between the pre-2005 and the post-2005 periods in terms of regional
power balances, the NPT, Iran’s threat perceptions and symbols attached to being a
nuclear power. Given the relative consistency of such variables, it is argued that we
should focus on domestic factors for a better explanation. In this respect, Graham
Allison’s bureaucratic politics model provides us with crucial insight into changes in
domestic political and bureaucratic establishments and their effect on nuclear decision-
making in Iran.
Bureaucratic Politics Model
In his seminal work Essence of Decision, Allison presents three models to explain
the Cuban missile crisis: the rational actor model, the organizational politics model,
and the governmental politics model. The main difference among these models is
that while the rational actor model assumes national government as a unified actor, the
two other models recognize it as a conglomeration of organizational or bureaucratic
actors. Of the three models, it is argued here that Model III is suitable to analyze the
sub-national foreign policy formation in the Iranian case. According to Allison “each
national government is a complex arena for intra-national games,” where “the decision-
maker of national policy is not one calculating individual but rather a conglomerate
of large organizations and political actors.”37 It is the ongoing bargains, tugs-of-war
and struggles amongst formal actors that ultimately affect a state’s foreign policy.38
Allison argues that “most of the players participate in foreign policy decision-
making by virtue of their roles” and positions in the government.39 The particular
positions define the players’ preferences, interests, capabilities and responsibilities.
Therefore, it becomes natural for actors to bring the perspectives and interests of
their own organizations or positions.40 Furthermore, the specific character who occupies
the position is important.41 Each actor’s operating style, sensitivities to certain issues,
commitments to various projects, personal standing within groups and personality
are all factors in the process.42 There are three analytically distinguishable factors
that shape a player’s perceptions, preferences and standpoints. First, actors have
parochial priorities which make them sensitive to their organization’s interests and
orientation.43 Second, personal and domestic interests play an important role in 
making decisions on foreign policy issues.44 Third, stakes are shaped by each player’s
understanding of what the national or organizational interest might be.45
According to Allison, governmental decisions are the result of a political process
where actors struggle to persuade others to adopt a specific course of action. The
policy output is determined by each player’s impact on it, which is a result of the 
relative power amongst the parties. Allison operationalizes power as a blend of
“bargaining advantages, skills and will in using these bargaining advantages, and
other players’ perceptions of the first two ingredients.”46 Such advantages “include
the formal authority and responsibility stemming from the position, control over
resources to carry out the specific action, expertise and control over information, the
ability to affect other players’ objectives, personal persuasiveness and access to players
who have bargaining advantages.”47 Taken together, the decisions and actions of
governments are intra-national political resultants. In other words, a decision is not
an ideal solution to a problem chosen among several options; rather it is a result of
compromise, conflict and bargaining among officials with diverse interests and
unequal influence.48
A notable adaptation of Allison’s bureaucratic politics model is offered by Sagan,
who provides an explanation of nuclear proliferation by focusing on domestic players
such as the nuclear energy establishment, senior military officers, politicians and
political parties.49 These actors’ personal and organizational interests play out in a
governmental political game where they try to persuade one another on the need for
acquiring nuclear weapons. For example, a scientific community within a country
may encourage a nuclear program to maintain the flow of money to their research
laboratories. Similarly, the military may tilt toward acquiring a nuclear capability as
a deterrent.50 Therefore, the formation and dissolving of coalitions among groups
within the decision-making process affects the eventual foreign policy outcomes.
Although the bureaucratic politics model has broadened our scope on decision-
making, it has not gone without criticism.51 A vast amount of literature has emerged
in the past four decades that criticizes or offers alternatives to Allison’s bureaucratic
politics model. While we cannot do full justice to all ranges of criticisms, we acknowl-
edge at least three central criticisms, which are the centrality of the president, the
pre-determination of national security interests and the applicability of this American-
born model to other national settings. We briefly review them below.
Scholars such as Krasner, Ball, Perimutter and Rosati have stressed the importance
of the president as the most powerful decision-maker in the state apparatus.52 The
president appoints higher-level personnel within the executive branch, determines
which players will be allowed access and are capable of suppressing all other options
and plans in the game.53 As a result, in Krasner’s words, “the ability of bureaucracies
to independently establish policies is a function of [p]residential attention.”54
According to this criticism, the bargaining and strategic interaction of various players
does not matter as much as that of the central decision-maker—the president. Relatedly,
Art and Welch argue that in many cases of decision-making, players do not engage
in bargaining, whereas Allison would assume they would “pull and haul to promote
their organizational interests.”55 Since authority is not evenly distributed, the name
of the game, in which players compete to persuade the most powerful decision-
maker—the president, is not “bargaining” but “persuasion.”56 As a result, bureaucratic
interests matter only in a few cases where the president is not a priori appointed as
the ultimate decision-maker.
A second set of criticisms argues that national security-interests are generally
accepted throughout the state apparatus.57 Freedman, for example, suggests that
although personal and organizational interests and personal characters matter, ultimately
“national security interests are usually predetermined and generally accepted.”58
Along with Freedman, Welch argues that personal, organizational and national interests
of each player may often overlap. This makes it difficult to decipher whether it was
really bureaucratic positions that influenced a specific decision.59 This set of criticism
calls for a greater emphasis on the state as a, more or less, unitary actor with identifiable
national security interests.
A third criticism of Allison is that the model is only applicable to the political
system of the United States and is not generalizable to other national settings.60 The
argument is that the laws and regulations of the American establishment allow
scholars to access various documents and to conduct interviews with key officials. 
Furthermore a democratic system, by its nature, is more open to scholarly investiga-
tion than a closed authoritarian system. While we agree that access to governmental
documents in the United States allows for a smoother application of the bureaucratic
politics model, the lack thereof in authoritarian countries does not mean that we
should disregard the importance of bureaucratic politics in such polities. Furthermore,
there have been successful applications of the model on closed political systems
such as Chinese policy debates between 1964 and 1966.61
While we acknowledge these critical contributions to the bureaucratic politics
literature, this paper affirms that the bureaucratic politics model is relevant. Although
this case study of Iran is an implicit response to previous criticisms, some preliminary
responses can be illustrated. The Iranian political establishment, like the United
States, has a top political actor that has the ultimate say in the affairs of the state—
the Supreme Leader. In this sense, the case of Iran allows the opportunity to test
whether the existence of a final decision-maker invalidates the bureaucratic politics
model. This analysis shows that even in apparent centralizations of power, as in a
theocratic regime, politics is politics and the nature of the game is open to various
strategic interactions among actors. As related to the second set of criticisms, it is
argued that the national-security interests of Iran are not given. Various actors within
the regime push and pull for their own stance on the nuclear issue. Third, in comparison
to the U.S. political establishment, Iran is on the opposite end of the spectrum as far
as regime types go. However, it is held that modern-nation states have more or less
similar authority structures—bureaucracies can be found in every modern political
regime. This paper seeks to show that even in a different case, as in Iran, the bureaucratic
politics model can give insights into the decision-making process of a state. This
paper’s articulation of these criticisms in the Iranian case will show how and why
Allison’s model is relevant to understanding the shift in Iranian decision-making. In
other words, we will be implicitly answering the shortcomings of Allison’s model.
It is contended in this paper that the changes in domestic political arrangements
between 2003 and 2005, specifically, the changes in the positions and bargaining
among key actors, is the reason why Iran has had a shift in its foreign policy over its
nuclear program. Although there has been national consensus on the nuclear program
in both periods, the key players’ preferences and relative power positions account
for the change in Iranian policy.62 In the following section an analysis is made of
each actor’s relative position within the regime, the source of their political power,
their status and authority within the legal framework, their political influence over
one another, and their ideological orientation and preferences.
Mapping Out the Bureaucratic Politics of Iran
Many scholars and observers depict the Islamic Republic of Iran as a closed-box—
a monolithic totalitarian regime with revisionist intentions. We hold that political
scientists and IR scholars cannot afford to overlook the complex structure of the
regime and the nature of decision-making. Iranian specialists point out that far from
a centralized power structure, Iran is ruled by “a multitude of often loosely connected
and fiercely competitive power centers.”63 While some of these power centers are
formal institutions of the state, others are informal in character. The informal power
centers manifest themselves as “loose coalitions among like-minded individuals or
groups” and as “personal patronage links.”64 Decision-making in many policy areas,
including the nuclear program, is the outcome of an interaction among these formal
and informal power centers, which are effected by factions, parochial interests and
personal baggages of various power holders. The Iranian regime provides us with a
picture of a highly complex decision-making process with various actors involved
depending on the policy area. The key actors of nuclear decision-making are the
Supreme Leader, the President, the SNSC, the IRGC and the AEOI. Although there
is a formal hierarchy amongst these actors, no single actor can be said to possess a
monopoly over nuclear decision-making.
From a constitutional perspective, the Supreme Leader is responsible for devising
general policies for the country and for supervising the executive, legislative, and
judicial branches of the government.65 As the head of the national security structure,
he has the authority to appoint top military bureaucrats, to command and mobilize
armed forces, and to declare war and peace.66 All major decisions, such as signing
the Additional Protocol or suspending uranium enrichment, require his signature.67
The centrality of the Supreme Leader in politics, however, is only apparent; his for-
mal and constitutional capacity does not preclude the fact that he interacts with and
is influenced by other actors in policy issues including national security. Therefore,
the Supreme Leader is only one actor who engages in negotiations and bargaining
with other actors on the nuclear program.
The President of Iran is the highest official elected by the public; however, his
status is subordinate to the Supreme Leader. As the head of the executive, he is
responsible for the appointment of ministers, the administration of government and
the implementation of the Constitution, which grants him the authority to sign
international treaties and protocols.68 The President’s appointment of ministers has a
direct impact on the formation of the SNSC, which is the highest body dealing with
the national security and foreign policy issues including Iran’s nuclear program.
Moreover, the President, as an elected official, reflects the various domestic factions’
attitudes toward a nuclear program. An overview of the domestic factions in Iranian
politics is therefore crucial to understand the position of the President in nuclear
decision-making.
The three main factions in Iranian domestic politics are traditionalists, reformists
and hardliners. Given the spectrum of Iranian politics, the traditionalists are situated at
the center; they put emphasis on religious rule and advocate a free market economy.69
Their preference for a bazaar economy makes them advocate a conciliatory and
pragmatic foreign policy.70 The conservatives have a strong representation in state
institutions such as the Guardian Council, the Special Court for the Clergy and the
Assembly of Experts.71 The reformists advocate an industry-based economy, modern
banking and closer relations with the West.72 While they advocate moderation and reform
in domestic politics, their motto for foreign policy is “pragmatism and rationalism” rather
than “tradition and conservatism.”73 Reformists, who call for an end to Iran’s
international isolation, are generally found amongst academics, journalists, students
and moderate clerics.74 The hardliners are dedicated to the protection of the Islamic
Revolution from its perceived external and internal enemies.75 The primary body
affiliated with this group is the Revolutionary Guards. Although all three factions
agree on a civilian nuclear program for energy purposes, they differ from each other
on how to handle the issue with the international community.
The central bureaucratic platform involved in nuclear decision-making is the
Supreme National Security Council. The SNSC’s significance in the nuclear decision-
making lies in the fact that it is responsible for performing negotiations with the
IAEA. The body determines the defense and national security policies in line with
the general policies specified by the Supreme Leader.76 The SNSC is chaired by the
President and includes the heads of three branches of the government, chief of the
Supreme Command Council of the Armed Forces, the officer in charge of planning
and budgetary affairs, two representatives nominated by the Supreme Leader, the minis-
ters of foreign affairs, interior and information, a minister related with the issue-area,
and the highest ranking officials from the Armed Forces and the IRGC.77 Although,
as Ziemke argues, the SNSC’s decisions are subject to the confirmation by the
Supreme Leader, the composition of the Council is determined by the President, who
appoints the members and thereby reflects his personal and factional preferences in
the nuclear program.78
Another important actor in the nuclear program is the Atomic Energy Organization
of Iran, which is the professional and scientific wing of the nuclear program. Established
in 1973 by the Shah, the AEOI is the central organization that manages all technical
aspects of the nuclear program including research laboratories, energy production,
research, fuel production, education and regulatory safety.79 AEOI has formally been
responsible for all of Iran’s nuclear projects.80
The final institution we consider is the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, which
was established by clerical leaders to ensure the success of the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
The IRGC’s main responsibility is to guard the Revolution and its achievements.81
Originally created to unite the paramilitary groups of the revolution, and serve as a 
possible counter-balance to the regular military previously loyal to the Shah, IRGC
came to be seen as a vanguard of the state during the Iran-Iraq war. IRGC’s size grew
enormously by 1985, and by the 1990s it became a professional fighting force symboliz-
ing Iran’s military modernization and self-reliance.82 The IRGC’s military and economic
power comes from many sources including the distribution network of contraband,
access to foundations such as the Disabled Veterans and the Disadvantaged, and the
manufacturing and international shipment of domestically produced weapons.83
Although subordinate to the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics, they
have increasingly become autonomous within the state.84 Given the economic and
political semi-autonomy of the IRGC, some analysts note that the IRGC may even pose
a challenge to the authority and directives of the Supreme Leader.85
A Conciliatory Iran: Pre-2005 Nuclear Decision-Making
Iran’s relations with the international community over its nuclear program until 2005
reflect elements of pragmatism, moderation and conciliation. Although there was
consensus among all actors on the necessity of the nuclear program for peaceful 
purposes, inter-agency disputes existed over how to manage the issue with the
international community.
As the formal ultimate decision-maker in foreign policy and security issues, the
Supreme Leader Khamenei has supported Iran’s nuclear program for peaceful 
purposes.86 Khamenei sees Iran’s nuclear program as a symbol of “self-sufficiency”
and “technological development,” and refers to the civilian nuclear program as an
“inalienable right” of the Iranian nation.87 Assuming a non-factional position in 
policy-related disputes, the Supreme Leader intervenes in factional disputes as the
“final arbiter” when such disputes seem to challenge the survival of the regime.88
This bureaucratic role of the Supreme Leader is exemplified in the nuclear issue as
well. For example, Hassan Rowhani, a pragmatic conservative, was appointed as the
secretary of the SNSC and chief negotiator with the EU-3 by the Supreme Leader.89
Khamenei’s intention to appoint Rowhani as chief negotiator was due to his desire to
strike a balance among several factions.
At the time of the exposure of Iran’s nuclear program, the president of Iran was
Mohammad Khatami. As a reformist, his foreign policy objectives were to diminish
Iran’s isolation, revive the domestic economy through international financial agreements
and to establish more dialogue and cooperation with the outside world.90 His
reformist supporters declared that “integration into the international order and the global
economy mandates accepting certain restrictions on [Iran’s] nuclear program.”91 The
U.S. proposal for Iran’s WTO membership and the EU-3 packages offering extended
trade relations were appealing to the reformist supporters of Khatami.92 Khatami’s
conciliatory position on nuclear negotiations can be attributed to economic and 
factional interests.
During this process, the foreign ministry was concerned with the IAEA’s requests
for inspections and wanted to avoid the diplomatic consequences for not complying
with the EU-3’s demands.93 The Foreign Minister of the time, Kharrazi, emphasized
“the need for the settlement of the issue” through “full cooperation with IAEA,”
“confidence-building,” “transparency” and “dialogue.”94 Not surprisingly, it was the
foreign minister who initially recommended a pragmatic Rowhani to Khatami and
Khamenei to be appointed as the nuclear negotiator and the secretary of the SNSC.95
By mid-2003, Tehran felt that “the gravity of the [international] negotiations
required high-level official attention,” leading to the meeting of the SNSC for the
first time to discuss the nuclear crisis.96 In that meeting, President Khatami devised
a decision-making mechanism composed of three committees within the SNSC for
negotiations.97 The nuclear decision-making elite then decided that one person
should coordinate all the committees involved in the nuclear issue, who was Hassan
Rowhani.98 These committees were mainly composed of reformists and conservative
traditionalists; both factions had strong economic reasons and political preferences
to cooperate with the international community.
Iran agreed to comply with IAEA inspections, to sign the Additional Protocol
and to cooperate with the EU on the nuclear issue during Rowhani’s nuclear chiefdom.
In a speech delivered to the Supreme Cultural Revolution Council, Rowhani stated
that “the Islamic Republic has never had political negotiations with this degree of
gravity—with such serious implications and with multiple political, legal, technical
and security dimensions.”99 Rowhani was concerned with the U.S. referral of the
issue to the UN Security Council and pursued a pragmatic foreign policy strategy to
delay it as long as possible.100
As the public face of the negotiations and agreements, chief negotiator Rowhani
met with strong opposition from several domestic actors, most notably by the scientific
community. Until the discovery of the nuclear facilities, the AEOI was responsible
for both the political and technical aspects of the nuclear program.101 From a
bureaucratic politics perspective, one may predict that out of parochial interests the
nuclear scientific community would have strong incentives for the continuation of
the nuclear program. There are several instances that show how this was the case in
Iran. First, following the exposure of the Natanz and Arak nuclear sites and the
international uproar that followed, AEOI went on a campaign to downplay the negative
implications for Iran of the increasing pressure from the international community.102
Second, as the negotiations with the EU-3 were reaching an agreement, the AEOI
President Aghazadeh was reluctant to cooperate as the agreement called for the 
suspension of all nuclear enrichment and reprocessing activities in the facilities.103
Khatami had previously allocated 800 million dollars for the completion of the
Bushehr facility. The AEOI scientists harshly opposed to the suspension of nuclear
activities as it would hamper their organizational prestige, reduce their budget, cut
their employment opportunities and damage their professional prestige.104 Third,
besides the AEOI there are other scientific organizations that had a stake in the
nuclear program such as Iran’s technical universities, research institutions and military
industrial organizations, all of which opposed the suspension of the program.105 For
example, “more than five hundred students and two hundred fifty faculty members
from Sharif Technical University in Tehran wrote an open letter to the government”
indicating that any agreement by Iran with the IAEA and EU-3 to suspend or stop
uranium enrichment program would be “treason.”106
A review of the pre-2005 period shows that Khatami and his reformist bureau-
cratic cadre pursued a conciliatory foreign policy with the EU-3.107 This is due to
the factional interests of the reformist camp and bureaucrats coupled by Khamenei’s
alliance with them. However the growing power of other factions and new alliances
within the regime would change the course of the cooperative foreign policy.
Changing Domestic Coalitions: Shifts in Iranian Policy
Iran’s moderate and pragmatic foreign policy approach on its nuclear program
underwent a dramatic shift in early 2005. During this period, Iran defied its commit-
ments to the international community by resuming work in its nuclear sites. Although
there was no significant change in the external strategic environment, the international
institutions, and the symbols attached to nuclear programs, Iran had changed its foreign
policy orientation regarding its nuclear program.
With the growing power of other factions, the conciliatory foreign policy came
under challenge. As one observer puts it, domestic politics was going to decide
whether Iran was going to be “a revolutionary state willing to defy the world, or a
normal state playing by international rules.”108 When hardliners gained control of
Iran’s parliament in 2004, they began criticizing reformists for pursuing a conciliatory
foreign policy strategy and jeopardizing the national interests.109 The presidential
elections that took place on August 2, 2005 resulted in the victory of hardliner 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.110
The Iranian nuclear program immediately became politicized under Ahmadinejad’s
presidency. Ahmadinejad saw the nuclear issue as an opportunity for playing against
his domestic rivals in the reformist camp. He could use the nuclear development 
“to encourage or tap into a sense of nationalism and a feeling of injustice, e.g., U.S.
double standards, the West versus the technological have-nots.”111 Ahmadinejad
was committed to the revolutionary ideals of protecting the country against external
predatory forces and preserving the country’s military self-reliance. As Dueck
emphasizes, “the international indifference to Saddam’s war crimes and Tehran’s
lack of an effective response has led Iran’s war veteran President to perceive that the
security of his country cannot be predicated on global opinion and treaties.”112
Ahmadinejad saw the EU as acting at the command of the United States and the
IAEA, who were, in Ahmadinejad’s words, “bullies determined to prevents Iran’s
progress and advancement.”113 Ahmadinejad, however, as a single individual could
not have changed the course of the entire country; there were bureaucratic coalitions
and alliances within the regime.
Increasing cooperation and possible treaties with the West gave Tehran incentives
for economic liberalization and opening up its market to the global economy. This
signaled a threat to IRGC’s power because the economic power of the Revolutionary
Guards emanates from their monopoly on the importation of expensive forbidden items
from Iranian ports under their strict control.114 Enjoying the tutelage and prosperity
of an import monopoly, IRGC opposed to Iran’s embrace of free market principles
and the subsequent opening to the global economy.115 Therefore, IRGC had a stake
in increased protectionism and an inward-looking state economy.116 IRGC’s material
interests for defying conciliation with the international community on the nuclear
issue also included military objectives. In 1982, IRGC established its own weapons
industry independently from the regular military.117 While the technological pillar of
the nuclear activities are under the control of AEOI, the Revolutionary Guards own
several companies that are responsible for the construction of nuclear sites and the
development of missiles.118 IRGC’s insistence on the uranium enrichment activities
can be understood as a reflection of its role in the defense establishment. Apart from
such material interests, IRGC has had parochial interests at the ideological level,
having to do with their own status in Iran.
Representing the hardliners in the Iranian government and society, Ahmadinejad
made significant changes in the bureaucratic apparatus.119 A former IRGC veteran
himself in the Iran-Iraq War, Ahmadinejad appointed former Revolutionary Guard
officials to various ministerial positions, thereby shaping the composition of the
SNSC. Apart from ministerial positions in the cabinet, Ahmadinejad also appointed
former IRGC officials as the head of the newly created directorates in the SNSC, as
the spokesman of the SNSC and as deputy heads of SNSC.120 He replaced Rowhani
with Ali Larijani as the Secretary of the SNSC.121 The newly elected president 
displayed a non-cooperative attitude toward incentive packages offered by the EU-3,
resumed the uranium enrichment activities, and ignored the international threats
either in the form of UN sanctions or U.S. military strikes.
Assuming a mediator position among factions and favoring consensus among
nuclear decision-makers during Khatami’s presidency, Supreme Leader Khamenei had
shifted to support the hardliner camp during Ahmadinejad’s presidency. Khamenei’s
gradual abandonment of his intermediary role among factions and his alignment with
certain factions is attributed by some scholars to his “theological Achilles’ heel.”122
Khamenei has been aware of the rising power of the hardliners both in the government
and among the public. He feels threatened by the Ahmadinejad-IRGC coalition, which
he thinks could replace him with Ahmadinejad’s hardliner mentor, Ayatollah Mesbah
Yazdi.123 Although Khamenei assumed the position of Supreme Leader, he lacked
Grand Ayatollah Khomeini’s political charisma and theological qualification.124
Khamenei was originally a mid-ranking clergy who was given the title of “Ayatollah”
overnight to qualify him to issue fatwas.125 As a result, Khamenei has always worried
about the fragility of the religious foundations of his political authority. Challenged
by a strong Ahmadinejad-Yazdi-IRGC coalition, Khamenei did not want to challenge
Ahmadinejad’s confrontational foreign policy because it may jeopardize his own
position as the Supreme Leader.
The outright defiant position of the hardliner camp against the international
community, however, has not gone unchallenged in the post-2005 period. One of Iran’s
top religious authorities, Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri, criticized Ahmadinejad’s
policy arguing that nuclear energy should be “obtained in a way that will not create
other problems, and without giving others an excuse to harm them.”126 Similarly, the
former chairman of the Foreign Policy Committee in the Supreme National Security
Council accused Ahmadinejad of not conducting a rational foreign policy.127
Following the replacement of Rowhani with Ali Larijani as the nuclear chief during the
Ahmadinejad era, the president and the new nuclear chief often displayed contradictory
positions regarding the nuclear issue and even gave contradictory testimonies to the
media.128 Nevertheless, these individuals and groups were not able to stop the course
of the new Iranian nuclear policy in the emerging alliance of hardliner bureaucratic
actors.
Iran’s post-2005 period nuclear strategy reflects the coalition between the President
and the IRGC, who have acquired key nuclear decision-making positions within the
SNSC. The heightened role of bureaucrats during Khatami’s presidency, notably of
Rowhani’s role as the chief nuclear manager, diminished during Ahmadinejad’s
presidency. The change in the nuclear strategies and policies Iran adopted in the pre-
2005 and post-2005 periods is explained by the change in the coalitions among multiple
bureaucratic actors involved in nuclear decision-making.
Conclusion
The analysis of Iran’s pre-2005 and post-2005 nuclear policy postures indicates
that governmental politics exist not only in democratic regimes, but also in closed
authoritarian regimes like Iran. The assumption that Iran is a unitary rational actor is
not useful; rather there are multiple power centers, each of which is competing to
shape Iran’s posture toward the international community. The analysis of nuclear
decision-making in both periods reveals domestic, personal and parochial interests
of actors who have bargaining advantages over others. President Ahmadinejad’s
appointment of IRGC officials to important positions in the SNSC has altered the
existing balance-of-power within the decision-making apparatus. The coalition between
the President and the IRGC increased both parties’ power in nuclear decision-making
vis-à-vis that of other actors such as the Supreme Leader. Although the Supreme
Leaders usually have an arbitrator position, Khamenei’s approval of Ahmadinejad has
increased the power of hardliners in the regime. The alliance among these hardliners
within the bureaucratic establishment has paved the way for reinitiating the nuclear
program.
The Iranian case supports the bureaucratic politics’ assumption that parochial,
personal, national, and domestic interests shape the actors’ positions toward the issue
at hand. However, it should be admitted that there is great difficulty in identifying
which of these interests might have contributed to the shaping of an actor’s position.
The AEOI’s push for the nuclear program can clearly be attributed to their parochial
interests, to ensure their survival. Similarly, the IRGC seems to be consolidating its
position in the regime by pushing for the nuclear program. Ahmadinejad’s tough
stance can be attributed to his ideology and background. The least clear case is that
of Ayatollah Khamenei. Due to the overlapping of his responsibilities as a cleric, as
the Supreme Leader of the regime, and as the ultimate decision-maker in all foreign
policy and security issues, the motives behind Khamenei’s shift toward the hardliners
is difficult to determine. Recently, Khamenei has strongly opposed to the president’s
decisions; Khamenei has rejected Ahmadinejad’s dismissal of the intelligence minister
Heydar Moslehi, out of fear that his power has grown too much. Furthermore, there
are now conservative factions whose interests are diverging from the foreign policy
course of the President.129 Along with the “Arab spring,” and internal challenges in
Iran, it is likely that the power of the hardliners would be further challenged, and so
would their foreign policy orientation. There are already signs to this as nuclear talks
have resumed between the West and Iran in the past few months, first with a confidence-
building meeting in Istanbul that is being followed by another round in Baghdad.
We have shown how Allison’s model has explanatory power in a relatively closed
and authoritarian political system. Second, despite the fact that the Supreme Leader
is the ultimate decision-maker on all national security issues, the President and
IRGC officials seem to have more power in determining the Iranian stance toward
the international community. This evidence challenges Allison’s critics who argue
that there is actually no bargaining at the executive level due to power imbalances.
Given the scarcity of academic research on Iranian bureaucracies, we hope that this
article may pave the way for further research on bureaucratic politics in non-democ-
racies. One notable shortcoming of the bureaucratic politics literature is its relative
negligence of international variables. Just as structural realism avoids the internal
political configurations of domestic politics, there is a possibility on the part of the
bureaucratic politics literature to underestimate the role of the “international” in the
domestic political setting. We would also like to suggest that one should also pay
attention to the interaction between international and domestic variables. Namely,
building on the second-image reversed literature, one may focus on the domestic
implications of international pressures.130 For example, the U.S. occupation of
Afghanistan and Iraq clearly had domestic implications. The hardliners in Iranian
politics were able to capitalize on a “rally around the flag” effect of this international
dynamic, which arguably, led them to strengthen their position in the country. This is
a key dimension that future research in bureaucratic politics research would want to
consider. This relates to the next issue regarding the Iranian nuclear program.
One core question remains as to the real intentions behind Iran’s nuclear 
program; that is whether the civilian nuclear program is a cover-up for a military
nuclear weapons program. Although a full explanation is beyond the immediate
scope of this paper, a direction to travel maybe hinted by relating two theoretical 
perspectives on foreign policy. From a realist perspective, Iran could be argued to
have strong incentives to use its civilian nuclear program as a cover-up for a weapons
program. This is not just so from a “structural anarchy” argument, but because of the
fact that Iran’s neighbors, both to its East and West, have been occupied by the United
States and its allies. From Iran’s own perspective, it faces an immediate security risk
from a United States that has occupied Afghanistan and Iraq. Furthermore, the fact
that Israel possesses nuclear weapons means that Iran would have strong rational
incentives to acquire one. In relation to the realist tone, from a bureaucratic politics
perspective one may argue that key power centers in Tehran and political factions
are strongly in favor of a weapons program. Setting aside the reformers, the political
factions in Iranian politics see the weapons program as a symbol of national pride,
and a viable hedge against a possible U.S.-led invasion. Furthermore, several
bureaucratic agencies have strong incentives to press for a weapons program. This is
not surprising given the recent evidence that suggests that key Iranian military sites
have been exposed to have secret installations, which experts argue are ongoing sites
for clandestine uranium enrichment.131 Furthermore, Iran has advanced most of its
nuclear program under the Supreme Leader Khamenei, although he claims that
“Islam forbids the development and use of nuclear weapons.”132 Therefore, the link
between the interaction of domestic level variables and international pressures may
show that the Iranian political elite, out of fear of an invasion, may have strong
incentives for a nuclear weapons program. It could also be argued that, from a power-
transition theory perspective, Iran would want to acquire a nuclear capability in
order to challenge U.S. hegemony in the Middle East.133
Five policy prescriptions follow from this analysis. First, the United States, the
EU, and their allies ought not to take aggressive measures against Iran, as this would
contribute to the strengthening of the hardliners—the ones that are responsible for
the defiant status over the nuclear program. Second, the United States and its allies
must pay attention to the factional divisions in Iranian politics. Third, as one of the
authors have suggested elsewhere, occasional threats to “wipe out the West” by
Ahmadinejad are not based on concrete material capabilities, and he knows it well.134
It is wiser to treat such language as domestic political rhetoric aimed at strengthening
his position. Pressing Ahmadinejad on such points will only make him stronger.
Fourth, in light of the domestic economic networks outlined in this article, the pressure
of sanctions that target Revolutionary Guards and other key officials is beginning to
be felt in high circles in Tehran.135 Finally, the rise of other major powers and the
weakening of the U.S. global economic position suggest that the United States
should not engage in unilateral policies and avoid potential quagmires; policymakers
in Washington should rethink their priorities if they want to maintain global leadership.
Turkey, as a rising regional power during the Arab Spring, may contribute to a possible
dialogue.136 There is also an opportunity for the EU, as preventing Iran from acquiring
nuclear weapons is one common foreign and security policy that all EU members
agree upon. A successful foreign policy on the part of the EU powers in this realm
can also help pave the way for a more institutionalized common foreign policy of
the EU.
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